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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-2981  
_____________ 
 
ROBIN TASCO 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD  
OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL #98 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-11-cv-01393) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2015 
____________ 
 
Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 15, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION*  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Robin Tasco brought suit against her former employer, the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local #98 (the “IBEW”), alleging federal and state 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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race and gender discrimination and retaliation.  After a jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the IBEW, Tasco moved for a new trial.  The District Court denied her motion, and she 
appealed.  We will affirm. 
I. 
We write solely for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  Tasco worked as a business agent for the IBEW for eight years.  Her son, 
Frank Clark, also worked for the IBEW.  Clark applied for an apprenticeship program 
with the IBEW but was rejected after failing a job-related exam.  He was fired shortly 
thereafter, and then filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (the “EEOC”) alleging race discrimination.  After Tasco’s boss became 
aware of Clark’s complaint, he “indicated to [her] that he would retaliate against anyone 
and everyone who ‘does this to me’ (meaning file a complaint) and stated that he could 
not ‘have them on my team.’”  Appendix 14a.  Tasco claims she was then fired because 
of her son’s complaint.  She filed this lawsuit in February 2011, asserting federal and 
state race and gender discrimination and retaliation claims.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment as to all of Tasco’s claims except her retaliation claims.   
Tasco’s trial was initially scheduled for May 20, 2013, and later rescheduled to 
August 26, 2013.  The parties filed their respective pretrial memoranda on March 14, 
2013.  In April and May 2013, the IBEW issued subpoenas to Tasco’s former lawyer and 
to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, seeking documents relating to 
Tasco’s prior personal injury, worker’s compensation, and unemployment compensation 
claims.  On August 21, 2013, the IBEW subpoenaed the Philadelphia Board of Elections, 
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seeking documents relating to Tasco’s prior candidacy for Philadelphia City Council and 
requesting a custodian witness for trial.  Also on August 21, 2013, the IBEW sent Tasco 
an updated trial exhibit list with seven new entries obtained through the April and May 
subpoenas.  All of the new exhibits concerned Tasco’s prior legal actions, and they 
included her deposition and in-court testimony, her worker’s compensation claim 
petition, her unemployment compensation questionnaires, and the unemployment 
compensation referee’s order in her case.  Tasco moved in limine to exclude these 
exhibits based on untimely disclosure, and the District Court denied that motion at trial.  
At trial, the IBEW impeached Tasco on cross-examination using those seven exhibits, as 
well as an additional document produced in response to the August subpoena.  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the IBEW. 
The District Court denied Tasco’s post-trial motion for a new trial.  The District 
Court held that the IBEW’s failure to turn over the documents produced in response to 
the April and May 2013 subpoenas and to disclose timely the seven trial exhibits from 
those productions caused Tasco no prejudice because (1) she was familiar with all the 
documents in question, (2) the IBEW had given Tasco notice that it was issuing the 
subpoenas, and (3) the exhibits were used only for impeachment.  The District Court then 
addressed the IBEW’s failure to turn over documents obtained from the Philadelphia 
Board of Elections, or to inform Tasco of the witness from the Board of Elections, until 
trial.  The District Court determined these untimely disclosures also caused no prejudice 
because (1) only a small number of documents were produced, (2) the one document used 
at trial was a public record, and (3) that document was used only for impeachment.   
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Tasco also claimed the untimely exhibits were irrelevant and prejudicial.  The 
District Court concluded that the exhibits were relevant for impeachment purposes.  The 
IBEW did not use the exhibits for the prejudicial suggestion that Tasco should not receive 
relief in this case because of her other successful suits.  Finally, the District Court 
rejected Tasco’s argument that a jury instruction on the “perception theory” of retaliation 
was necessary.  It was not disputed, according to the District Court, that the IBEW was 
aware of Clark’s protected activity, and, therefore, such an instruction was inapplicable.         
Tasco timely appealed the District Court’s denial of a new trial on her retaliation 
claims. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We generally review a district court’s 
ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.  Where the ruling was based on 
a determination of law, our review is plenary.  McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 
F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009).   
III. 
 A district court “may . . . grant a new trial . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for 
which a new trial has heretofore been granted.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1).  As Tasco 
points out, we have previously remanded for a new trial based on a district court’s error 
in admitting evidence where that evidence affected a party’s substantial right.  E.g., 
Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 205-07 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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 The District Court here, however, committed no error.  It was within its discretion 
to allow the IBEW to use the untimely disclosed documents at trial because the 
documents did not prejudice Tasco.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (failure to disclose 
timely information or witness results in exclusion unless the nondisclosure is 
“harmless”).  Tasco authored the documents at issue herself (except for one, and that was 
the decision in her unemployment compensation case).  Under this circumstance, and 
especially given that she received notice of the subpoenas, Tasco cannot claim she was 
unaware of these documents.  Moreover, the documents were used only for impeachment.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A) (excepting from pretrial disclosure evidence presented 
solely for impeachment).  They were relevant for that purpose, see United States v. 
Green, 617 F.3d 233, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[E]vidence concerning a witness’s credibility 
is always relevant.”), and not used for any of the prejudicial purposes of which Tasco 
complains.          
 Nor did the District Court err in refusing to instruct the jury on the “perception 
theory” of retaliation.  See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3d Cir. 2002).  
That jury instruction is appropriate where the protected activity at issue may not have 
occurred, but the employer believes that it did.  Here, there is no dispute that the IBEW 
knew that Clark filed a complaint with the EEOC (the protected activity). 
 As a result, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Tasco’s motion for a new trial.        
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
